Most supermarket …rms choose to position themselves by o¤ering either "Every Day Low Prices" (EDLP) across several items or o¤ering temporary price reductions (promotions) on a limited range of items. While this choice has been addressed from a theoretical perspective in both the marketing and economic literature, relatively little is known about how these decisions are made in practice, especially within a competitive environment. This paper exploits a unique store level dataset consisting of every supermarket operating in the United States in 1998. For each of these stores, we observe the pricing strategy the …rm has chosen to follow, as reported by the …rm itself. Using a system of simultaneous discrete choice models, we estimate each store's choice of pricing strategy as a static discrete game of incomplete information. In contrast to the predictions of the theoretical literature, we …nd strong evidence that …rms cluster by strategy by choosing actions that agree with those of its rivals. We also …nd a signi…cant impact of various demographic and store/chain characteristics, providing some quali…ed support for several speci…c predictions from marketing theory.
Introduction
While …rms compete along many dimensions, pricing strategy is clearly one of the most important. In many retail industries, pricing strategy can be characterized as a choice between o¤ering relatively stable prices across a wide range of products (often called "every day low pricing") or emphasizing deep and frequent discounts on a smaller set of goods (referred to as "promotional" or PROMO pricing). Although Wal-Mart did not invent the concept of every day low pricing (EDLP), the successful use of EDLP was a primary factor in their rapid rise to the top of the Fortune 500, spawning a legion of followers selling everything from toys (Toys R Us) to building supplies (Home Depot). In the 1980s, it appeared that the success and rapid di¤usion of the EDLP strategy could spell the end of promotions throughout much of retail. However, by the late 1990s, the penetration of EDLP had slowed, leaving a healthy mix of …rms following both strategies, and several others who used a mixture of the two.
Not surprisingly, pricing strategy has proven to be a fruitful area of research for marketers. Marketing scientists have provided both theoretical predictions and empirical evidence concerning the types of consumers that di¤erent pricing policies are likely to attract (e.g. Lal and Rao, 1997; Bell and Lattin, 1998 ). While we now know quite a bit about where a person is likely to shop, we know relatively little about how pricing strategies are chosen by retailers. There are two primary reasons for this. First, these decisions are quite complex: managers must balance the preferences of their customers and their …rm's own capabilities against the expected actions of their rivals. Empirically modeling these actions (and reactions) requires formulating and then estimating a complex discrete game, an exercise which has only recently become computationally feasible. The second is the lack of appropriate data. While scanner data sets have proven useful for analyzing consumer behavior, they typically lack the breadth necessary for tackling the complex mechanics of inter-store competition. 1 The goal of this paper is to combine newly developed methods for estimating static games with a rich, nation-wide dataset on store level pricing policies to identify the primary factors that drive pricing behavior in the supermarket industry.
Exploiting the game theoretic structure of our approach, we aim to answer three ques-1 Typical scanner data usually re ‡ect decisions made by only a few stores in a limited number of markets.
tions that have not been fully addressed in the existing literature. First, to what extent do supermarket chains tailor their pricing strategies to local market conditions? Second, do certain types of chains or stores have advantages when it comes to particular pricing strategies? Finally, how do …rms react to the expected actions of their rivals? We address each of these questions in detail.
The …rst question naturally invites a market "pull" driven explanation in which consumer demographics play a key role in determining which pricing strategy …rms choose.
In answering this question, we also aim to provide additional empirical evidence that will inform the growing theoretical literature on pricing related games. Since we are able to assess the impact of local demographics at a much broader level than previous studies, our results provide more conclusive evidence regarding their empirical relevance.
The second question posed above addresses the match between a …rm's strategy and its chain-speci…c capabilities. In particular, we examine whether particular pricing strategies (e.g. EDLP) are more pro…table when …rms make complementary investments (e.g. larger stores and more sophisticated distribution systems). The empirical evidence on this matter is scarce -this is the …rst paper to address this issue on a broad scale. Furthermore, because our dataset includes every existing supermarket, we are able to exploit variation both within and across chains to assess the impact of store and chain level di¤erences on the choice of pricing strategy.
Finally, we address the role of competition posed in our third question by analyzing …rms'reactions to the expected choices of their rivals. In particular, we ask whether …rms face incentives to distinguish themselves from their competitors (as in most models of product di¤erentiation) or instead face pressures to conform (as in network or switching cost models)? This question is the primary focus of our paper and the feature that most distinguishes it from earlier work.
Our results shed light on all three questions. First, we …nd that consumer demographics play a signi…cant role in the choice of local pricing strategies: …rms choose the policy that their consumers demand. Furthermore, the impact of these demographic factors is consistent with both the existing marketing literature and conventional wisdom. For example, EDLP is favored in low income, racially diverse markets, while PROMO clearly targets the rich. However, a key implication of our analysis is that these demographic factors act as a coordinating device for rival …rms, helping shape the pricing landscape by de…ning an equilibrium correspondence. Second, we …nd that complementary investments are key: larger stores and vertically integrated chains are signi…cantly more likely to adopt EDLP.
Finally, and most surprisingly, we …nd that stores competing in a given market have incentives to coordinate their actions. Rather than choosing a strategy that distinguishes them from their rivals, stores choose strategies that match. This …nding is in direct contrast to existing theoretical models that view pricing strategy as a form of di¤erentiation. While we do not aim to test a particular theory of strategic pricing behavior, we hope a deeper examination of these competitive interactions will address important issues that have remained unanswered.
Our paper makes both substantive and methodological contributions to the marketing literature. On the substantive front, our results o¤er an in-depth look at the supermarket industry's pricing practices, delineating the role of three key factors (demand, supply and competition) on the choice of pricing strategy. We provide novel, producer-side empirical evidence that complements various consumer-side models of pricing strategy. In particular, we …nd quali…ed support for several claims from the literature on pricing demographics, including Bell and Lattin's (1998) model of basket size and Lal and Rao's (1997) positioning framework, while at the same time highlighting the advantages of chain level investment.
Our focus on competition also provides a structural complement to Shankar and Bolton's (2004) descriptive study of price variation in supermarket scanner data, which emphasized the role of rival actions. Our most signi…cant contribution, however, relates to the …nding that stores in a particular market do not use pricing strategy as a di¤erentiation device but instead coordinate their actions. This result provides a direct challenge to the conventional view of retail competition, opening up new and intriguing avenues for future theoretical research. Our econometric implementation also contributes to the growing literature in marketing and economics on the estimation of static discrete games, as well as the growing literature on social interactions 2 . In particular, our incorporation of multiple sources of 2 Recent applications of static games include technology adoption by internet service providers (Augereau et al. 2006) , product variety in retail eyewear (Watson, 2005) , location of ATM branches (Gowrisankaran and Krainer, 2004) , and spatial di¤erentiation among supermarkets (Orhun, 2005) , discount stores (Zhu et al., 2005) , and video stores (Seim, 2006) . Structural estimation of social interactions is the focus of papers by Brock and Durlauf (2002) , Bayer and Timmins (2006) , and Bajari et al. (2005) . private information and our construction of competitive beliefs are novel additions to these emerging literatures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the pricing landscape, explicitly de…ning each strategy and illustrating the importance of local factors in determining store level decisions. Section 3 introduces our formal model of pricing strategy and brie ‡y outlines our estimation approach. Section 4 describes the dataset.
Section 5 provides the details of how we implement the model, including the construction of distinct geographic markets, the selection of covariates, our two-step estimation method, and our identi…cation strategy. Section 6 provides our main empirical results and discusses their implications. Section 7 concludes with directions for future research.
The Supermarket Pricing Landscape

Pricing Strategy Choices
Competition in the supermarket industry is a complex phenomenon. Firms compete across the entire retail and marketing mix, enticing customers with an attractive set of products, competitive prices, convenient locations, and a host of other services, features, and promotional activities. In equilibrium, …rms choose the bundle of services and features that maximize pro…ts, conditional on the types of consumers they expect to serve and their beliefs regarding the actions of their rivals. A supermarket's pricing strategy is a key element in this multidimensional bundle.
The vast majority of both marketers and practitioners frame a store's pricing decision as a choice between o¤ering "every day low prices"or deep but temporary discounts, labeling the …rst strategy EDLP and the second PROMO. 3 This is, of course, a simpli…cation since a supermarket's pricing policy is closely tied to its overall positioning strategy. Pricing strategies are typically chosen to leverage particular operational advantages and often have implications for other aspects of the retail mix. For example, successful implementation of EDLP may involve o¤ering a deeper and narrower product line than PROMO, allowing …rms to exploit scale economies (in particular categories), reduce their inventory carrying costs, and lower their advertising expenses. On the other hand, PROMO pricing gives …rms greater ‡exibility in clearing overstock, allows them to quickly capitalize on deep manufacturer discounts, and facilitates the use of consumer loyalty programs (e.g. frequent shopper cards). In other words, the choice of pricing strategy is more than just how prices are set: it re ‡ects the overall positioning of the store. 4 Clearly the EDLP-PROMO dichotomy is too narrow to adequately capture the full range of …rm behavior. In practice, …rms can choose a mixture of EDLP and PROMO, varying either the number of categories they put on sale or changing the frequency of sales across some or all categories of products. Not surprisingly, practitioners have coined a term for these practices -hybrid pricing. What constitutes HYBRID pricing is necessarily subjective, depending on an individual's own beliefs regarding how much price variation constitutes a departure from "pure"EDLP. Both the data and de…nitions used in this paper are based on a speci…c store level survey conducted by Trade Dimensions in 1998, which asked individual store managers to choose which of the following categories best described their store's pricing policy:
Everyday Low Price (EDLP): Little reliance on promotional pricing strategies such as temporary price cuts. Prices are consistently low across the board, throughout all packaged food departments.
Promotional (Hi-Lo) Pricing: Heavy use of specials, usually through manufacturer price breaks or special deals.
Hybrid EDLP/Hi-Lo: Combination of EDLP and Hi-Lo pricing strategies.
According to Trade Dimensions, the survey was designed to allow for a broad interpretation of the HYBRID strategy, as they wanted it to capture deviations along either the temporal (i.e. number of sales per year) or category based dimensions (i.e. number of categories on deal). We believe that pricing strategy is best viewed as a continuum, with pure EDLP (i.e. constant margins across all categories) on one end and pure PROMO (i.e. frequent sales on all categories) at the other. This dataset represents a coarse discretization of that continuum. 5 4 In this paper we focus only on the pricing strategy dimension and take other dimensions of the retail mix as given. While this is limiting, modeling the entire retail mix is beyond the scope of this paper. 5 We will address the issue of data validity -whether these self-reported strategies match up to observed pricing behavior -in section 4.2.
Supermarket Pricing: A Closer Look
Without observing data on individual stores, it might be tempting to conclude that all pricing strategies are determined at the level of the chain. While there are certainly incentives to choose a consistent policy, the data reveals a remarkable degree of local heterogeneity.
To examine the issue more closely, we focus in on a single chain in a single market: the Pathmark chain in New Jersey. Figure 1 shows the spatial locations of every Pathmark store in New Jersey, along with its pricing strategy. Two features of the data are worth emphasizing. We address them in sequence.
First, Pathmark does not follow a single strategy across its stores: 42% of the stores use PROMO pricing, 33% follow EDLP, and the remaining 25% use HYBRID. The heterogeneity in pricing strategy observed in the Pathmark case is not speci…c to this particular chain. Table 3 shows the store level strategies chosen by the top 15 U.S. supermarkets (by total volume) along with their total store counts. As with Pathmark, the major chains are also surprisingly heterogeneous. While some …rms do have a clear focus (e.g. Wal-Mart, H.E.
Butt, Stop & Shop), others are more evenly split (e.g. Lucky, Cub Foods). This pattern extends to the full set of …rms. Table 4 shows the pricing strategies chosen by large and small chains, using four alternative de…nitions of "large"and "small". 6 While "large"chains seem evenly distributed across the strategies and "small" chains seem to favor PROMO, …rm size is not the primary determinant of pricing strategy.
The second noteworthy feature of the Pathmark data is that even geographically proximate stores adopt quite di¤erent pricing strategies. While there is some clustering at the broader spatial level (north vs. south New Jersey), the extent to which these strategies are interlaced is striking. Again, looking beyond Pathmark and New Jersey con…rms that this within-chain spatial heterogeneity is not unique to this particular example: while some chains clearly favor a consistent strategy, others appear quite responsive to local factors.
Broadly speaking, the data reveal only a weak relationship between geography and pricing strategy. While southern chains such as Food Lion are widely perceived to favor EDLP and Northeastern chains like Stop & Shop are thought to prefer promotional (PROMO) pricing, regional variation does not capture the full story. Table 2 shows the percent of stores that choose either EDLP, HYBRID, or PROMO pricing in eight geographic regions of the U.S. While PROMO pricing is most popular in the Northeast, Great Lakes and central Southern regions, it is far from dominant, as both the EDLP and HYBRID strategies enjoy healthy shares there as well. EDLP is certainly popular in the South and Southeast, but PROMO still draws double digit shares in both regions. This heterogeneity in pricing strategy can be illustrated using the spatial structure of our dataset. Figure 2 plots the geographic location of every store in the U.S., along with their pricing strategy. As is clear from the panels corresponding to each pricing strategy, there is no obvious pattern: all three strategies exhibit quite uniform coverage. Taken together, these observations suggest looking elsewhere for the primary determinants of pricing strategy. We turn next to the role of market demographics and then to the nature and degree of competition. Table 5 contains the average demographic characteristics of the local market served by stores of each type. 7 PROMO pricing is associated with smaller households, higher income, fewer automobiles per capita, and less racial diversity, providing some initial support for Bell and Lattin's (1998) in ‡uential model of "basket size" 8 . However, the di¤erences in demography, while intuitive, are not especially strong. This does not mean that demographics are irrelevant, but rather that the aggregate level patterns linking pricing strategy and demographics are not overwhelming. Isolating the pure impact of demographic factors will require a formal model, which we provide below.
The …nal row of Table 5 contains the share of rival stores in the competing market that employ the same strategy as the store being analyzed. Here we …nd a striking result: 50% of a store's rivals in a given location employ the same pricing strategy as the focal store.
Competitor factors were also the most important explanatory factor in Shankar and Bolton's (2004) analysis of pricing variability in supermarket scanner data. In particular, they note that "what is most striking, however, is that the competitor factors are the most dominant 7 Roughly corresponding to areas the size of a ZipCode, these "local markets" are de…ned explicitly in Section 5.2.
8 Bell and Lattin (1998) …nd that the most important features of shopping behavior can be captured by two interrelated choices: basket size (how much you buy) and shopping frequency (how often you go). They suggest that large or …xed basket shoppers (i.e. those who buy more and shop less) will more sensitive to the overall basket price than those who shop frequently and will therefore prefer EDLP pricing to PROMO. They present empirical evidence that is consistent with this prediction. determinants of retailer pricing in a broad framework that included several other factors". Even at this rather coarse level of analysis, the data reveal that most stores choose similar pricing strategies to their rivals. This pattern clearly warrants a more detailed investigation and is the focus of our structural model. Three central features of supermarket pricing strategy emerge from this discussion.
First, supermarket chains often adopt heterogeneous pricing strategies, suggesting that demand related forces can sometimes outweigh the advantages of chain level specialization.
Second, local market factors play a key role in shaping demand characteristics. Finally, any empirical analysis of pricing strategy must include the role of competition. While investigating the role of market demographics and …rm characteristics is not conceptually di¢ cult, quantifying the structural impact of rival pricing strategies on …rm behavior requires a formal game theoretic model of pricing behavior that accounts for the simultaneity of choices.
In the following section, we embed pricing strategy in a discrete game that accommodates both local demographics and the strategies of rival …rms. We then estimate this model using a two-step approach developed by Bajari et al. (2005) .
A Strategic Model of Supermarket Pricing
A supermarket's choice of pricing strategy is naturally framed as a discrete game between a …nite set of players. Each …rm's optimal choice is determined by the underlying market conditions, its own characteristics and individual strengths, and its expectations regarding the actions of its rivals. Notably, the strategic choice of each …rm is a function of the anticipated choices of its competitors, and vice versa. If strategic expectations were ignored, a …rm's choice of pricing strategy would be a straightforward discrete choice problem. However, since …rms will condition their strategies on their beliefs regarding rivals'actions, this discrete choice must be modeled using a system of simultaneous equations. In what follows, we outline our model of strategic pricing in detail. In our framework, …rms (i.e. supermarket chains 9 ) make a discrete choice of pricing strategy, selecting among three alternatives: everyday low pricing, promotional pricing, and a hybrid strategy. While there is clearly a role for dynamics in determining an optimal pricing policy, we assume that …rms act simul-9 Henceforth, we will use "chains" and "…rms" interchangeably. taneously in a static environment, taking entry decisions as given. 10 A static treatment of competition is not altogether unrealistic since these pricing strategies involve substantial store level investments in communication and positioning related costs that are not easily reversible. 11 In what follows, we assume that competition takes place in 'local'markets, 12 each contained in a 'global'market (here, an MSA). Before proceeding further, we must introduce some additional notation. Stores belonging to a given chain c = 1; ::; C; that are located in a local market l m = 1; ::; L m ; in an MSA m = 1; ::; M; will be indexed using i lm c = 1; ::; N lm c :
The total number of stores in a particular chain in a given MSA is N m c = ; and represent …rm speci…c shocks to the pro…tability of each strategy. The private information assumption makes this a game of incomplete or asymmetric information (e.g. Harsanyi, 1973) and the appropriate equilibrium concept one of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). 13 For any given market, the
's are assumed to be iid across …rms and actions, and drawn from a distribution f i lm c
that is known to everyone, including the econometrician.
Firms choose pricing strategies in each store independently, with the objective of maximizing expected pro…ts in each store. In market l m , the pro…t earned by store i c is given
; a i lm c
where
is a known and deterministic function of states and actions (both own and rival's). This di¤ers from a standard discrete choice framework because the actions of a …rm's rivals enter its payo¤ function. Since the 's are treated as private information, a …rm's decision rule a i lm c
is a function of the common state vector and its own , but not the private information of its rivals. From the perspective of both its rivals and the econometrician, the probability that a given …rm chooses action k conditional on the common state vector is then given by
where 1
o is an indicator function equal to 1 if store i lm c chooses action k and 0 otherwise. We let P lm denote the set of these probabilities for a given local market.
Since the …rm does not observe the actions of its competitors prior to choosing an action, it makes decisions based on these expectations (i.e. beliefs). The expected pro…t for …rm 
which is the system of equations that de…ne the (pure strategy) BNE of the game. Because a …rm's optimal action is unique by construction, there is no need to consider mixed strategies.
If the 's are drawn from a Type I Extreme Value distribution (i.e. Gumbel errors), this BNE must satisfy a system of logit equations (i.e. best response probability functions).
The general framework described above has been applied in several economic settings and its properties are well understood. In particular, existence of equilibrium follows easily from
Brouwer's …xed point theorem (McKelvy and Palfrey, 1995) .
To proceed further, we need to choose a particular speci…cation for the expected pro…t functions. We will assume that the pro…t that accrues to store i lm c from choosing strategy k in location l m is given by
where, as before, s m is the common state vector of both market (local and MSA) and …rm characteristics (chain and store level). The E 
Note that we have assumed that payo¤s are a linear function of the share of stores that choose EDLP and PROMO, which simpli…es the estimation problem and eliminates the need to consider the share who choose HYBRID (H) . We further normalize the average pro…t from the PROMO strategy to zero, one of three assumptions required for identi…cation (we discuss our identi…cation strategy in detail in section 5.7). In addition, we have assumed that the private information available to store i lm c (i.e. i lm c
) can be decomposed into three additive stochastic components:
where " 
the optimal choice probabilities (conditional on m c (k) ; c (k)) for a given store can be written as
while the likelihood can be constructed as
Note that the construction of the likelihood involves a system of discrete choice equations that must satisfy a …xed point constraint (P lm = lm ) . There are two main approaches for dealing with the recursive structure of this system, both of which are based on methods originally applied to dynamic discrete choice problems. The …rst, based on Rust's (1987) Nested Fixed Point (NFXP) algorithm, involves solving for the …xed point of the system at every candidate parameter vector and then using these …xed point probabilities to evaluate the likelihood. This is the method used by Seim (2006) in her analysis of the video rental market. The NFXP approach, however, is both computationally demanding and straightforward to apply only when the equilibrium of the system is unique. 14 An alternate approach, based on Hotz and Miller's (1993) Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) estimator, involves using a two-step approach that is both computationally light and more robust to multiplicity. 15 The …rst step of this procedure involves obtaining consistent estimates of each …rm's beliefs regarding the strategic actions of its rivals. These "expectations" are then used in a second stage optimization procedure to obtain the structural parameters of interest. Given the complexity of our problem, we chose to adopt a two-step approach based on Bajari et al. (2005) , who were the …rst to apply these methods to static games.
Dataset
The Pricing Survey
The data for the supermarket industry are drawn from Trade Dimension's 1998 Supermarkets Plus Database, while corresponding consumer demographics are taken from the decennial Census of the United States. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Trade Dimensions collects store level data from every supermarket operating in the U.S. for use in their Marketing Guidebook and Market Scope publications, as well as selected issues of Progressive Grocer magazine. The data are also sold to marketing …rms and food manufacturers for marketing purposes. The (establishment level) de…nition of a supermarket used by Trade Dimensions is the government and industry standard: a store selling a full line of food products and generating at least $2 million in yearly revenues. Foodstores with less than $2 million in revenues are classi…ed as convenience stores and are not included in 1 4 It is relatively simple to construct the likelihood function when there is a unique equilibrium, although solving for the …xed point at each iteration can be computationally taxing. However, constructing a proper likelihood (for the NFXP) is generally intractable in the event of multiplicity, since it involves both solving for all the equilibria and specifying an appropriate selection mechanism. Simply using the …rst equilibrium you …nd will result in mispeci…cation. A version of the NFXP that is robust to multiplicity has yet to be developed.
1 5 Orignally developed for dynamic discrete choice problems, two-step estimators have been applied to dynamic discrete games by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2006) , Bajari et al. (2006) , Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2002) , and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2002) . Instead of requiring a unique equilibrium to the whole game, two-step estimators simply require a unique equilibrium be played in the data. Futhermore, if the data can be partioned into distinct markets with su¢ cient observations (as is the case in our application), this requirement can be weakened even further. the dataset. 16 Information on pricing strategy, average weekly volume, store size, number of checkouts, and additional store and chain level characteristics was gathered using a survey of each store manager, conducted by their principal food broker. With regard to pricing strategy, managers are asked to choose the strategy that is closest to what their store practices on a general basis: either EDLP, PROMO or HYBRID. The HYBRID strategy is included to account for the fact that many practitioners and marketing theorists view the spectrum of pricing strategies as more a continuum than a simple EDLP-PROMO dichotomy (Shankar and Bolton, 2004) . The fact that just over a third of the respondents chose the HYBRID option is consistent with this perception.
Survey Validity
We should emphasize that all of these variables, including the information on pricing strategy, are self-reported. This may raise some concerns regarding accuracy, especially given the high degree of local variation we observe in the data. Two questions naturally arise.
First, are …rms truly willing and able to set prices at such local levels? Second, do these self-reported strategies re ‡ect actual di¤erences in pricing behavior? We will address both issues in turn.
First, with regard to local pricing, we should note that supermarket …rms clearly have the technological resources to set prices (and therefore pricing strategy) at a very local level.
Indeed, Montgomery (1997) provides a novel method for pro…tably customizing prices at the store level, using widely available scanner data. 17 We contacted pricing managers at several major chains and other industry professionals regarding their ability to engage in such micro-marketing. Even on the condition of anonymity, they were extremely reluctant to discuss the details of their actual pricing strategies, but did acknowledge that "they certainly have the data and resources to do it."Furthermore, a consultant who was involved in several recent supermarket mergers con…rmed that the extent of local pricing was a key factor in the approval process. 18 A related issue concerns whether …rms may also face pressure to maintain a consistent (pricing) image across stores. We suspect not. Unlike many other types of retail food services (e.g. fast food establishments), supermarket customers do the majority of their shopping in a single store. 19 Therefore, while consumers undoubtedly have strong preferences over the pricing strategy of their chosen store, they have little reason to care directly about the overall strategy of the chain. Of course, chains may have strong operational incentives (e.g. scale economies in distribution and advertising) to maintain a consistent strategy across several (not necessarily proximate) stores, which might lead them to adopt a common strategy in multiple outlets. Indeed, we are relying on just such incentives to provide the variation needed to identify the e¤ect of strategic interactions (we will return to this identi…cation argument in Section 5.7). The point is that …rms may indeed have both strong incentives and the ability to tailor pricing to the local environment.
The second question concerns the validity of the survey instrument itself. We note …rst that the survey was of store managers but administered by brokers (who explained the questions), providing an additional level of cross-validation. It is unlikely that the results reported below could be the product of systematic reporting error, as this would require coordination between tens of thousands of managers and thousands of brokers to willfully and consistently mis-report their practices (for no obvious personal gain). However, to further allay such fears, we cross-veri…ed the data ourselves using publicly available data from the Dominick's Finer Foods (DFF) supermarket chain in Chicago. In particular, we extracted store level prices from four major product categories for every store in the DFF dataset and matched them up to the pricing classi…cations reported by Trade Dimensions.
The vast majority of the Dominick's stores are identi…ed as PROMO (93%), while the remainder are HYBRID, which is itself encouraging since Dominick's is known to be a PROMO chain. We then checked whether the incidence of promotions (i.e. whether a UPC was "on sale") varied across PROMO and HYBRID stores. In all four categories that we examined (Soft Drinks, Oatmeal, Paper Towels, and Frozen Juice), we found a signi…cantly lower incidence of promotions at the HYBRID stores. The di¤erences ranged from 8.1% in Soft Drinks (a very heavily promoted category) to 23.4% in Oatmeal. All di¤erences were signi…cant at the 1% level.
In addition, we also compared the HYBRID and PROMO stores for equality in the variance of the prices using standard folded F tests. One would expect PROMO stores to have higher variances. For three of the four categories (Oatmeal, Paper Towels and Frozen Juice) the variance in prices was indeed higher in the PROMO stores, validating the survey data. The di¤erence was not signi…cant for Soft Drinks category. We also repeated each analysis for only the highest selling UPC in each category and found qualitatively similar results. While these tests use only a few product categories from a single chain in a single market, the sharpness of the results should provide additional con…dence in the integrity of our data.
Empirical Implementation
The empirical implementation of our framework requires three primary inputs. First, we need to choose an appropriate set of state variables. These will be the market, store and chain characteristics that are most relevant to pricing strategy. To determine which speci…c variables to include, we draw heavily on the existing marketing literature. Second, we will need to de…ne what we mean by a "market". Finally, we need to estimate beliefs and construct the empirical likelihood. We outline each of these steps in the following subsections, concluding with a discussion of unobserved heterogeneity and our strategy for identi…cation.
Determinants of Pricing Strategy
The focus of this paper is the impact of rival pricing policies on a …rm's own pricing strategy.
However, there are clearly many other factors that in ‡uence pricing behavior. Researchers in both marketing and economics have identi…ed several, including consumer demographics, rival pricing behavior, and market, chain, and store characteristics (Shankar and Bolton, 2004 ). Since we have already discussed the role of rival …rms, we now focus on the additional determinants of pricing strategy.
Several marketing papers highlight the impact of demographics on pricing strategy Hoch et al.,1994; Lal and Rao, 1997; Bell and Lattin, 1998) . Of particular importance are consumer factors such as income, family size, age, and access to automobiles. In most strategic pricing models, the PROMO strategy is motivated by some form of spatial or temporal price discrimination. In the spatial models (e.g. Lal and Rao, 1997; Varian, 1980) , PROMO pricing is geared toward consumers who are either willing or able to visit more than one store (i.e. those with low travel costs) or, more generally, those who are more informed about price levels. The EDLP strategy instead targets those with higher travel costs or those who are less informed (perhaps due to heterogeneity in the cost of acquiring price information). In the case of temporal discrimination (Bell and Lattin, 1998; Bliss, 1988) , PROMO pricing targets the customers who are willing to either delay purchase or stockpile products, while EDLP targets customers that prefer to purchase their entire basket in a single trip or at a single store. Clearly, the ability to substitute over time or across stores will depend on consumer characteristics. To account for these factors, we include measures of family size, household income, median vehicle ownership, and racial composition in our empirical analysis.
Since alternative pricing strategies will require di¤ering levels of …xed investment (Lattin and Ortmeyer, 1991) , it is important to control for both store and chain level characteristics.
For example, large and small chains may di¤er in their ability to e¢ ciently implement pricing strategies (Dhar and Hoch, 1997) . Store level factors are also likely to play a role (Messinger and Narasimhan, 1997). For example, EDLP stores may need to carry a larger inventory (to satisfy large basket shoppers), while PROMO stores might need to advertise more heavily.
Therefore, we include a measure of store size and an indicator variable for whether it is part of a vertically integrated chain. Finally, since the e¤ectiveness of pricing strategies might vary by market size (e.g. urban versus rural), we include measures of geographic size, population density, and average expenditures on food.
Market De…nition
The supermarket industry is composed of a large number of …rms operating anywhere from 1 to 1200 outlets. We focus on the choice of pricing strategy at an individual store, abstracting away from the more complex issue of how decisions are made at the level of the chain. Since we intend to focus on store level competition, we need a suitable de…nition of the local market. This requires identifying the primary trading area from which each store draws potential customers. Without disaggregate, consumer-level information, the task of de…ning local markets requires some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we assume markets can be de…ned by spatial proximity alone, which can be a strong assumption in some circumstances (Bell, Ho, and Tang (1998) ). However, absent detailed consumer level purchase information, we cannot relax this assumption further. Therefore, we will try to be as ‡exible as possible in de…ning spatial markets.
Although there are many ways to group …rms using existing geographic boundaries (e.g. ZipCodes or Counties), these pre-speci…ed regions all share the same drawback: they increase dramatically in size from east to west, re ‡ecting established patterns of population density. 20 Rather than imposing this structure exogenously, we allow the data to sort itself by using cluster analysis. In particular, we assume that a market is a contiguous geographic area, measurable by geodesic distance and containing a set of competing stores. Intuitively, markets are groups of stores that are located "close to one another". To construct these markets, we used a statistical clustering method (K means) based on latitude, longitude and ZipCode information. 21 Our clustering approach produced a large set of distinct clusters that we believe to be a good approximation of the actual markets in which supermarkets compete. These store clusters are somewhat larger than a typical ZipCode, but signi…cantly smaller than the average county.
We varied the number of clusters and found about eight thousand to best describe the spatial patterns in the supermarket landscape. A typical county and the clusters within it are depicted in Figure 3 . As is evident from the map, our clustering method appears to capture geographic proximity in a sensible manner. While there are undoubtedly other factors (such as highways or rivers) that might cause consumers to perceive markets in slightly di¤erent ways, we believe that these geographic clusters constitute a reasonable 2 0 One exception is Census block groups, which are about half the size of a typical ZipCode. However, we feel that these areas are too small to constitute reasonably distinct supermarket trading areas.
2 1 ZipCodes are required to ensure contiguity: without ZipCode information, stores in Manhattan would be included in the same market as stores in New Jersey. choice of market de…nition for this industry. As robustness checks, we experimented with the number of clusters, broader and narrower de…nitions of the market (e.g. ZipCodes and MSAs), as well as nearest neighbor methods and found qualitatively similar results (see Appendix A.1).
Estimation Strategy
As noted above, the system of discrete choice equations presents a challenge for estimation.
We adopt a two stage approach based on Bajari et al. (2005) that avoids solving for a …xed point. The …rst step is to obtain a consistent estimate of P lm ; the probabilities that appear (implicitly) on the right hand side of equation (9) 
The Likelihood
In our econometric implementation, we will assume that and are independent, mean zero normal errors, so that
where both F and F are mean zero normal distribution functions with …nite covariance matrices. For simplicity, we also assume that the covariance matrices are diagonal with elements 2 (k) and 2 (k). For identi…cation, consistent with our earlier independence and 's are functions of P lm . 2 3 In particular, we bootstrapped across markets (not individual stores) and held the pseudorandom draws in the simulated likelihood …xed across bootstrap iterations. To save time we used the full data estimates as starting values in each bootstrap iteration. normalization assumptions, we assume that m c (P ) = c (P ) = 0 8 c 2 C; m 2 M: These assumptions allows us to use a simulated maximum likelihood procedure that replaces (10) with its sample analog 
In the simulation procedure, [ m c (k)] r and [ c (k)] r are drawn from mean zero normal densities with variances 2 (k) and 2 (k) respectively. We use R = R = 500 and maximize (12) to obtain estimates of the structural parameters. Note that the …xed point restriction, P lm = lm ; no longer appears since we have replaced P lm with b P lm in the formulae for We turn now to a discussion of how we estimate beliefs.
Estimating Beliefs
In an ideal setting, we could recover estimates of each store's beliefs regarding the conditional choice probabilities of its competitors using fully ‡exible non-parametric methods (e.g. kernel regressions or sieve estimators). Unfortunately, given the large number of covariates we have included in our state vector, this is not feasible. Instead, we employ a parametric approach for estimating^ i lm c
; using a mixed multinomial logit (MNL) speci…cation to recover these …rst stage choice probabilities (Appendix A.4 contains a semi-parametric robustness analysis). Note that this is essentially the same speci…cation employed in the second stage procedure (outlined above), only the store's beliefs regarding rivals' actions are excluded from this reduced form. Note that we do not require an explicit exclusion restriction, since our speci…cation already contains natural exclusion restrictions due to the presence of state variables that vary across stores and chains.
We implement an estimator similar to (12), but with the coe¢ cients on the i 
While this expression is di¢ cult to evaluate analytically, the vector of beliefs de…ned by
can be approximated by its simulation analog Recalling that k 2 K = fE; H; P g ; we can now de…ne a consistent estimator of
Common Unobservables
While our dataset is rich enough to include a large number of covariates upon which …rms may condition their actions, the strong emphasis we have placed on strategic interaction may raise concerns regarding the role of unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, how can we be sure that …rms are actually reacting to the actions of their rivals, rather than simply optimizing over some common but unobserved features of the local market? Manski (1993) frames this as the problem of distinguishing endogenous e¤ects from correlated e¤ects. 25 Although the presence of both e¤ects yields collinearity in the linear in means model that
Manski analyzes (i.e. the re ‡ection problem), the non-linearity of the discrete choice framework eliminates this stark non-identi…cation result in our setting. However, the presence of correlated unobservables remains a concern. In what follows, we outline two strategies for handling this problem. The …rst incorporates a …xed e¤ect at the MSA level, while the second incorporates a random e¤ect at the level of the cluster. Our main results are robust to either alternative.
The most direct solution is to add a common unobservable, denoted lm ; to the strategy speci…c pro…t function of each store. Using the notation de…ned earlier, this can be written
Ideally, one would estimate each lm as a cluster speci…c …xed e¤ect. However, this would require estimating 8,000 additional parameters with less than 18,000 observations, which is clearly infeasible. 26 A feasible alternative is to model the common unobservable at the level of the MSA (i.e. include m instead of lm ): In practice, this simply involves running the …rst stage separately for each MSA and then adding an MSA level …xed e¤ect to the second stage procedure. This has the added bene…t of relaxing the equilibrium restriction: we need now only assume that a unique equilibrium is played in every MSA, instead of across all MSAs. We implement this strategy below. However, given the local nature of the strategic interaction documented here, an MSA level common unobservable may not be su¢ cient to account for the relevant correlated e¤ects.
An second alternative is to use a cluster level random e¤ ect (i.e. assume the unobservables come from a pre-speci…ed density g lm ) and simply integrate out over lm in the second stage estimation procedure, maximizing the resulting marginalized sample likelihood. However, there is an additional impediment to implementing this strategy: the fact that lm is a common unobservable prevents the econometrician from obtaining a consistent 2 5 Manski (1993) also considers the role of contextual e¤ects, whereby the "propensity of an individual to behave in some way varies with the distribution of background characteristics of the group". The static setting of our game eliminates this third type of "social interaction". 2 6 Bajari et al. (2005) suggest using "…xed e¤ects" which are restricted to be smooth functions of the observed state variables. However, this is also infeasible given the sheer number of local clusters (we cannot perform the non-parametric …rst stage proposed there).
…rst stage estimate of P lm : (Note that this is not a problem if the …rst stage can be estimated separately for each market, as was the case with the MSA level unobservable). Unfortunately, the two-step estimator employed above requires a consistent …rst stage estimate of these beliefs. 27 Since we cannot construct consistent …rst stage estimates of P lm ; we need a method that does not depend upon them. In practice, this will involve solving repeatedly for the …xed point(s) of the game ( lm = P lm ). One possible estimation strategy is then to adopt a nested …xed point approach that evaluates the …xed point of the system at each parameter value (the inner loop), while an outer maximization procedure searches over the parameter space (the outer loop). This is Seim's (2006) approach, which is itself based on Rust's (1987) NFXP algorithm. However, the sheer size of our state space makes this approach extremely burdensome. A clever alternative, proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) (henceforth AM) in the context of dynamic discrete games, involves swapping the order of the inner and outer loops of the NFXP, resulting in large computational gains and some additional robustness to multiplicity. We adopt an approach based on AM that is tailored to our particular setting (the details of our algorithm are provided in appendix B).
There are a few key di¤erences between our approach and the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) algorithm proposed by AM. First, unlike AM, our game is static. This does not alter the main econometric properties of the NPL estimator, since a static game is simply a oneperiod subcase of a dynamic one. However, a natural consequence of the static setting is that the state variables do not transition over time, allowing us to extend the NPL approach to include continuous states. 28 A more signi…cant point of departure between our algorithm and the NPL is the inclusion of continuous heterogeneity. Since the evolution of the observed state variables naturally depends on the unobserved state variables, AM 2 7 The inconsistency of the …rst stage follows from the econometrician's inability to measure a market factor that all players observe and condition their strategies on. When the unobserved factors are treated as private information, the information set of the econometrician is the same as each of the players (with regard to forming the equilibrium beliefs that de…ne the reaction functions). This is true even when the unobserved factors are …rm speci…c (so long as they are privately observed). However, when the players observe something about the market that the econometrican does not, this equivalence is broken. Note that this is not a concern in standard (single agent) discrete choice problems since strategic interaction variables (i.e. ) do not enter the model.restricted their estimator to a …nite support. In our case, the static nature of the problem, coupled with an independence assumption ( lm is orthogonal to s), allows us to simply integrate out over a continuous heterogeneity distribution. An attractive feature of the NPL algorithm is that it works even in the presence of inconsistent or poorly estimated initial probabilities. As long as the algorithm converges, it will do so to the root of the likelihood equations. 29 In our experience, the procedure converged very quickly to the same …xed point for several di¤erent starting values.
Identi…cation
Bajari et al. (2005) establish identi…cation of the structural parameters of a broad class of discrete games of incomplete information, of which ours is a subcase. Their identi…cation argument rests on three assumptions. The …rst two have already been (implicitly) stated, but will be repeated here more formally. The …rst assumption is that the error terms are distributed i:i:d: across players and actions in any given local market (i.e. cluster) 30 and are drawn from a distribution of known parametric form. This is clearly satis…ed by the assumptions imposed above. The second assumption normalizes the expected pro…t associated with one strategy to zero. This is a standard identi…cation assumption of any multinomial choice model. We normalize the mean pro…t of the PROMO strategy to zero.
The …nal assumption is an exclusion restriction.
The need for an exclusion restriction can be illustrated using equation (9). Our two-step estimation procedure involves estimating the shares ( i lm c 's) on the right hand side of (9) in a …rst stage. These shares, which are simple functions of each …rm's beliefs regarding the conditional choice probabilities of its rival's, depend on the same state vector (s m ) as 2 9 Furthermore, if a consistent initial estimator of P lm were available, stopping the NPL algorithm at any iteration r (before convergence) would yield a consistent estimator. In other words, the algorithm provides a sequence of consistent estimators, with each iteration improving e¢ ciency (if the algorithm were updated in…nitely often (r ! 1) ; the estimates would converge to Rust's NFXP solution).
However, we should note that while the AM approach appears to work well in practice, there are some limitations. The key issue is that, unlike the two-step approach, the AM strategy iterates around the …xed point until convergence. In cases where there is a unique equilibrium, it will always converge to the correct …xed point. However, in situations where multiple …xed points exist, there is no easy way of ensuring (or choosing) to which one it converges. We started the algorithm at multiple starting points to check for robustness and found no problems.
the …rst term of the pro…t function (s m0 k ), creating a potential collinearity problem. Of course, identi…cation can be trivially preserved by the inherent non-linearity of the discrete choice problem, but this follows directly from functional form. An alternative strategy (suggested by Bajari et al. (2005) ) involves identifying one or more continuous covariates that enter …rm i's payo¤s, but not the payo¤s of any of its rivals. Note that each …rm's private shock ( i lm c ) has already been assumed to satisfy this restriction, creating at least one set of "natural" exclusion restrictions. The characteristics of rival …rms constitute an additional exclusion. However, a more subtle identi…cation issue concerns the source of exogenous variation in the data that can pin down the form of strategic interaction. For this, we exploit the speci…c structure of the private information term and the presence of large multi-market chains. The two random e¤ect terms in (7) capture each …rm's tendency to employ a consistent strategy within an MSA ( m c (k)) and/or across all stores ( c (k)) in the chain. These …rm level tendencies vary across chains and markets, providing a source of variation for the local interactions that take place in any given cluster. The key assumption is that we sometimes see …rms that follow a consistent strategy (EDLP, for example) at the market level, deviate in a local cluster by playing either PROMO or HYBRID when the demographics of the local market or its beliefs regarding rival strategies outweigh its desire to follow a consistent (chain or MSA-wide) strategy. This has much of the ‡avor of an instrumental variable strategy, where the instruments are measures of the overall strategy a chain adopts outside the local market or MSA. In order to maintain the static, local, simultaneous move structure of the game, we have restricted these …rm level tendencies to be privately observed random e¤ects. However, an alternative speci…cation in which we conditioned directly on the average strategies that …rms follow outside a given MSA yielded similar results. 31
Results and Discussion
As noted earlier, choosing an optimal pricing strategy is a complex task, forcing …rms to balance the preferences of their customers against the strategic actions of their rivals. A major advantage of our two-step estimation approach is that, by estimating best response 3 1 A full set of results for this alternative speci…cation are available from the authors upon request. probability functions rather than equilibrium correspondences, we can separately identify strategic interactions, reactions to local and market level demographics, and operational advantages associated with larger stores and proprietary distribution systems. The Bayesian structure of the game allows us to account for di¤erent equilibria with the same covariates, due to the presence of unobserved types. More importantly, it allows us to model all 8,000 markets as variations in the play of a game with the same structure, but di¤erent conditioning variables. As the conditioning variables vary, we are able to trace out the equilibrium correspondence and identify the impact of several distinct forces. First, we …nd that …rms choose strategies that are tailored to the demographics of the market they serve.
Moreover, the impact of demographics corresponds closely to existing empirical studies of consumer preferences and conventional wisdom regarding search behavior. Second, we …nd that the EDLP strategy is favored by …rms that operate larger stores and are vertically integrated into distribution. Again, this accords with conventional wisdom regarding the main operational advantages of EDLP. Finally, with regard to strategic interaction, we …nd that …rms coordinate their actions, choosing pricing strategies that match their rivals. This identi…es an aspect of …rm behavior that has not been addressed in the existing literature: exactly how …rms react to rival strategies.
Our main empirical results are presented in Table 6 . The coe¢ cients, which represent the parameters of the pro…t function represented in equation (6), have the same interpretation as those of a standard MNL model: positive values indicate a positive impact on pro…tability, increasing the probability that the strategy is selected relative to the outside option (in this case, PROMO).
The Role of Demographics
The coe¢ cients on consumer demographics are presented in the second and third sections of Table 6 . With the exception of two MSA-level covariates, every demographic factor plays a signi…cant role in the choice of EDLP as a pricing strategy. This is important from an econometric standpoint, since we use these very same factors to construct expectations in the …rst stage. In particular, the signi…cance of the estimates means that we do not have to worry about collinearity. The statistical signi…cance of the parameters is also substantively important. It suggests that the even after accounting for competitive and supply side (store/chain) characteristics, consumer demand plays a strong role in determining pricing strategy.
Focusing more closely on the demand related parameters, we …nd that (relative to PROMO), EDLP is the preferred strategy for geographic markets that have larger households HH = 0:5566 , more racial diversity in terms of African-American ( 
Firm and Store Level Characteristics
Turning next to chain and store level characteristics, we again …nd that most parameter estimates are statistically signi…cant. These e¤ects, which are in line with both theory and broad intuition, provide an additional empirical validation of our structural framework.
The last two sections of Table 6 show that stores choosing EDLP are both signi…cantly larger SS = 0:0109 and far more likely to be vertically integrated V I = 0:1528 into distribution. This is consistent with the view that EDLP requires substantial …rm level investment, careful inventory management, and a deeper selection of products in each store to satisfy the needs of one-stop shoppers. It is also consistent with the model of Lal and Rao (1997) , in which pricing strategy involves developing an overall positioning strategy, requiring complementary investments in store quality and product selection. Surprisingly, the total number of stores in the chain is negatively related to EDLP ST = 0:0002 , although this is di¢ cult to interpret since almost all the large chains are vertically integrated into distribution (i.e. there are almost no large, non-vertically integrated …rms). Finally, both the chain speci…c and chain/MSA random e¤ects are highly signi…cant, which is not surprising given the geographic patterns shown earlier. . In other words, we …nd no evidence that …rms di¤ erentiate themselves with regard to pricing strategy. To the contrary, we …nd that rather than isolating themselves in strategy space, …rms prefer to coordinate on a single pricing policy. In other words, pricing strategies are strategic complements.
This coordination result stands in sharp contrast to most formal models of pricing behavior, which (at least implicitly) assume that these strategies are vehicles for di¤erentiation.
Pricing strategy is typically framed as a method for segmenting a heterogeneous market…rms soften price competition by moving further away from their rivals in strategy space. This is not the case for supermarkets. Instead of …nding the anti-correlation predicted by these 'spatial' models, we …nd evidence of associative matching, which usually occurs in settings with network e¤ects or complementarities. This suggests that …rms are able to increase the overall level of demand by matching their rivals' strategies, a possibility we discuss in more detail in what follows. However, before discussing our coordination result in greater detail, we must address the issue of correlated unobservables.
The surprising nature of our coordination result demands careful consideration. Again, 3 2 An earlier version of this paper also included the share of each …rm's stores outside the local MSA that employ EDLP and PROMO pricing as additional regressors. Not surprisingly, a …rm's propensity to follow a particular strategy at the level of the chain had a large and signi…cant impact on its strategy in a particular store (and soaked up a lot of variance). While this suggests the presence of signi…cant scale economies in implementing pricing strategies, as suggested by both Lattin and Ortmeyer (1991) and Hoch et al. (1994) , we omitted it from the current draft in order to maintain the internal coherency of the underlying model (i.e. the simultaneity of actions). However, these results are available from the authors upon request. how can we be sure that …rms are actually reacting to the actions of their rivals, rather than simply optimizing over some common but unobserved features of the local market? Section 5.6 described two alternative strategies for dealing with the potential presence of common unobservables. The …rst method involved adding an MSA level …xed e¤ect to the baseline speci…cation. In practice, this requires estimating the …rst stage separately for each MSA (to ensure a consistent …rst stage) and then expanding the second stage likelihood to include an MSA …xed e¤ect. The main coordination results are presented in the section of Table   7 titled "MSA by MSA"(the demographic and chain level covariates have been suppressed for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request). While the coe¢ cients have changed slightly in magnitude, the main coordination result remains strong. The second method involved adding a cluster level random e¤ect, and re-estimating the model using Aguirregabiria and Mira's (2006) NPL algorithm. These results are presented in the section titled "NPL". Here we …nd that the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients fall relative to both the baseline and "MSA by MSA"speci…cations, as one might expect if …rms are indeed reacting to a common unobservable. However, the coordination e¤ects are still large and signi…cant.
Pricing strategies are indeed strategic complements.
The Bayesian structure of our game allows us to represent a quite complex game using a relatively simple structure. By tracing out the equilibrium correspondence, we have found that …rms favor particular strategies in certain markets, in ways that are consistent with existing theory. We have also found that certain types of …rms favor particular strategies, which is also consistent with existing theory. Finally, we have found that …rms are more likely to choose a particular strategy if they expect their rivals to do the same. This is a sharp departure from existing theory. It is worth emphasizing that reactions to market demographics and …rm characteristics help explain how …rms are able to coordinate on consistent strategies. However, they do not explain why they choose to do so. Coordination implies that …rm's conditional choice probabilities act as strategic complements, meaning that their best response probability functions (9) are upward sloping. To support such complementarity, coordination must somehow increase the overall size of the perceived market. In most cases, this means drawing expenditures away from the outside good.
In the context of supermarket pricing, this suggests that coordination may actually increase the amount consumers are willing to spend on groceries, perhaps by drawing them away from substitutes like restaurants, convenience stores, and discount clubs. One way this might occur in practice is if consumers are more likely to "trust"retailers that provide a message that is consistent with those of their rivals. In other words, if one …rm tells you that providing the highest value involves high price variation while another touts stable prices, you may be unwilling to trust either, shifting your business to a discount club or another retail substitute. While this intuition has yet to be formalized, it is consistent with the emphasis that Ortmeyer et al. (1991) place on maintaining "pricing credibility".
Another possibility, consistent with Lal and Rao (1997) , is that price positioning is multidimensional and by coordinating their strategies stores can mitigate the costs of competing along several dimensions at once. Without a formal model of consumer behavior and detailed purchase data, we are unable to pin down the exact source of the complementarities we have documented here. However, we have provided strong empirical evidence regarding how …rms actually behave. Understanding why …rms …nd it pro…table to coordinate their actions remains a promising area for future theoretical research.
The results presented above provide de…nitive answers to the three questions posed in the introduction of this paper. We have found that demand related factors (i.e. demographics) are important for determining the choice of pricing strategy in a market; store and …rm level characteristics also play a central role. Both of these results are in line with the extant literature. However, our results concerning competitive expectations are in sharp contrast to prevailing theory in both economics and marketing and warrant further attention. The …nal section outlines a research agenda for extending the results found in this paper.
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
This paper analyzes supermarket pricing strategies as discrete game. Using a system of simultaneous discrete choice models, we estimate a …rm's optimal choice conditional on the underlying features of the market, as well as each …rm's beliefs regarding its competitor's actions. We …nd evidence that …rms cluster by strategy, rather than isolating themselves in product space. We also …nd that demographics and …rm characteristics are strong determinants of pricing strategy. From a theoretical perspective, it is clear that we have yet to fully understand what drives consumer demand. The fact that …rms coordinate with their rivals suggests that consumers prefer to receive a consistent message. While our results pertain most directly to supermarkets, it seems likely that other industries could behave similarly. Future research could examine the robustness of our …ndings by analyzing other retail industries, such as department stores or consumer electronics outlets.
In this paper, our primary focus was the construction and econometric implementation of a framework for analyzing best responses to rival pricing strategies. Our analysis describes the nature of strategic interactions, but does not delve into the details of why these strategies are dominant. Decomposing the why element of strategic coordination seems a fruitful area of research. We hasten to add that such research is needed not only on the empirical side but also on the theoretical front. Building theoretical models that allow for the possibility of both di¤erentiation and coordination is a challenging but undoubtedly rewarding path for future research.
The tendency to coordinate raises the possibility that games such as this might support multiple equilibria. While this is not a concern in our current study, it could play a central role when conducting policy experiments or when analyzing settings in which demographics (or other covariates) cannot e¤ectively facilitate coordination. Developing methods that are robust to such possibilities remains an important area for future research.
Finally, in building our model of strategic interaction, we have assumed that …rms interact in a static setting, making independent decisions in each store. A more involved model would allow chains to make joint decisions across all of their outlets and account for richer (dynamic) aspects of investment. Developing such a model is the focus of our current research.
A Robustness Checks
In this appendix, we examine the robustness of our results to alternative speci…cations and distributional assumptions. In particular, we focus on (1) market de…nition, (2) nonparametric estimation of beliefs, (3) linearity of the response functions and (d) the parametric error structure.
A.1 Market Delineation and De…nition
As noted earlier, our empirical analysis uses speci…c market de…nitions based on spatial cluster analysis. We veri…ed the robustness of our results to alternative market de…nitions by repeating the analysis using ZipCodes, Counties, and MSAs. In all cases, the results were qualitatively similar. We also varied the number of clusters and again found no signi…cant di¤erences in the results reported above. In addition we also conducted some analysis using n-nearest neighbor methods (we tried 3 and 5 nearest neighbors of a focal store) and found very similar results to those reported in this paper.
A.2 Multiplicity
As we noted earlier, consistent estimation of a static (or dynamic) game requires some form of uniqueness of equilibrium, either in the model or in the data. 33 Consistency of our baseline model requires only one equilibrium be played in the data, which, in our context, means every location in every MSA. It is possible to relax this by estimating the …rst stage separately for each MSA, so the requirement becomes a unique equilibrium be played in each MSA (we do not have enough data to estimate the …rst stage separately for each cluster, which would eliminate the problem entirely). The results of this procedure were very close to the baseline model. For brevity, we report only the coe¢ cients on the strategy variables (see Table 7 ).
A.3 Format Characterization
In our baseline model, we assumed that …rms care only about the share of their rivals that choose each strategy. An alternative, similar to what is done in the entry literature, is to assume that …rms care instead about the number of rivals. We re-estimated the baseline model using counts instead of shares and found qualitatively similar results.
A.4 Nonparametric Estimation of i
As noted above, the ideal approach for estimating beliefs involves non-parametric techniques. However, the number of covariates we use precludes us from adopting such a strategy. To assess the robustness of our results, we used a bivariate thin-plate spline to model pricing strategies as non-parametric functions of the strategies chosen outside the MSA. Again, the main results were qualitatively similar to those presented above.
A.5 Nonlinearity of f i
To examine the potentially non-linear relationship between payo¤s ( ) and strategies i , we adopted a smoothing splines approach to modeling f ( il ). In particular, we reestimated our model using a bivariate thin-plate spline, treating the functional relationship 
The qualitative results obtained using the linear speci…cation continue to hold. Since the results for the other variables are similar, we will not repeat our earlier discussion of their e¤ects here but focus only on the strategic results pertaining to pricing strategy. In particular, we focus our attention on the EDLP case to illustrate our …ndings. Figure 4 depicts the smoothed functional relation between beliefs about competitor strategy and the probability of choosing EDLP. As with the linear speci…cation, we observe evidence of …rms collocating in strategy space. The probability of …rms choosing EDLP increases with the proportion of competitors that also choose EDLP.
A.6 Error Structure
In our analysis we assumed that …rm types (the i 's) were distributed Gumbel (Type I Extreme Value), allowing us to specify set of simultaneous multinomial logit choice probabilities for determining pricing policies. As an alternative speci…cation, similar to the empirical application in Bajari et al. (2005) , we also tested ordered logit/probit models in which the strategies were ranked on a EDLP-HYBRID-PROMO continuum. While qualitative …ndings were similar, these ordered speci…cations force a particular ordering of the strategies that may not be warranted.
B Nested Pseudo Likelihood Algorithm (NPL)
We assume that the common unobservables are jointly distributed with distribution function F lm j ; where is a set of parameters associated with F . To start the algorithm, let The main numbers in each cell are means, standard deviations are in parentheses. 
